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Abstract
This paper develops a two-country multi-frictional model where the
freeze on liquidity access to commercial banks in one country raises un-
employment rates via credit rationing in both countries. The expenditure-
switching channel, whereby asymmetric monetary shocks traditionally
lead to negative comovements of home and foreign outputs, is considerably
weakened via opposite forces driving the exchange rate. Meanwhile, it is
proved that ﬁnancial market integration forms a transmission channel per
se, without resorting to international cross-holdings of risky assets. The
search and matching modeling serves two purposes. First, it accounts for
the time needed to restore a normal level of conﬁdence following ﬁnancial
market disruptions. Second, it allows dissociating pure liquidity contrac-
tions from non-walrasian ﬁnancial shocks, arriving despite global excess
savings and due to heterogeneity in the quality of the banking system.
The former induce negative comovements of home and foreign outputs, in
accordance with the literature, whereas the new type of ﬁnancial shocks
does generate ﬁnancial contagion.
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11 Introduction
A salient feature of the 2007-2008 crisis is that an economic recession rapidly
propagated throughout the developed world although originated by a downturn
in speciﬁc US ﬁnancial markets. In particular, most of the Eurozone countries
experienced severe GDP falls and unemployment rises despite their ﬂexible ex-
change rate regime with the dollar and a solvent internal demand that could
have made them less vulnerable to external shocks than export-led emerging
market economies.
While it is widely agreed that ﬁnancial shocks transmit across countries
within a ﬁxed exchange rate regime or within a monetary union because tying
the hands of monetary policy, there is much less theory about similar interac-
tions between major economic areas in a ﬂoating exchange rate context. Even
more surprisingly, traditional open-economy frameworks such as Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (1995) generally consider that negative monetary shocks would beneﬁt
other countries, since the relative appreciation of the domestic currency resulting
from an interest rate rise boosts the exports of these foreign countries. In par-
ticular, total demand for foreign goods increases because expenditure-switching
eﬀects worldwide outweigh the negative wealth eﬀect in the ﬁrst country.
However, one may think that this reasoning could not necessarily hold in
a more sophisticated setting where opposite forces drive the exchange rate dy-
namics implied by the shock and where ﬁnancial frictions may result in a more
than proportionate impact on real activity. This leads to investigate a potential
international ﬁnance multiplier phenomenon, according to the term employed
by Krugman (2008). Indeed, the recent events suggest the need for a general
equilibrium model that can account both for a ﬁnancial multiplier that magni-
ﬁes the impact of a credit crunch on domestic real activity and for interaction
mechanisms that result in a deteriorated situation in all countries, especially in
the ones that did not originate the ﬁnancial turbulences.
This question has been explored in models that rely on the incompleteness
of ﬁnancial markets in the countries to which crises are transmitted (since Allen
and Gale, 2000, notably). More generally, contemporaneous open macro models
with ﬁnancial contagion within a ﬂoating exchange rate system assume comple-
mentarity between domestic and foreign ﬁnancial assets. The simple intuition
is that an unanticipated decline in domestic asset value damages the balance
sheets of foreign investors because the latter had previously diversiﬁed their
portfolio by acquiring domestic ﬁnancial assets (Krugman, 2008). This is prob-
ably accurate when explaining the transmission of ﬁnancial crises to emerging
market economies (Dooley and Hutchison, 2009, Jotikasthira, Lundblad, and
Ramadorai, 2009) which acquire US assets to alter the maturity and risk dis-
tribution of their holdings. However, no evidence supports this assumption for
ﬁnancial interactions between developed countries. On the contrary, it is more
likely that the Eurozone distribution of ﬁnancial assets is substitutable to the
US distribution, as pointed out by Dedola and Lombardo (2009) for instance.
In this case, the literature puzzle in the ﬂoating exchange rate regime remains.
This paper thus develops a two-country multi-frictional model where a new
2type of ﬁnancial shocks freezing the liquidity access to commercial banks in
one country raises unemployment rates via credit rationing in both countries.
Assuming that credit markets are important to ﬁrms, a sudden deterioration in
loan opportunities constrains their participation to the labor market, therefore
resulting in adverse employment outcomes rather than in a real interest rate
surge. Hence, the exchange rate does not necessarily vary in the way predicted
by the theory, in turn annihilating the traditional price competitiveness channel
mentioned above. Meanwhile, the substitutability of home and foreign ﬁnancial
assets creates ﬁnancial market integration that helps propagate the crisis by
equalizing external ﬁnance conditions worldwide.
The search and matching theory is used to depict frictional credit markets in
the spirit of Wasmer and Weil (2004). Its application to global ﬁnancial markets
further captures two important aspects here. First, this environment accounts
for the fact that, after sudden ﬁnancial market disruptions, restoring a normal
level of conﬁdence takes time, therefore preventing immediate market clearing
by international arbitrage from ﬁnancial investors. Second, it allows to nest the
pure liquidity contractions of the literature as a particular case while introducing
new non-walrasian ﬁnancial shocks, called here conﬁdence shocks as they arrive
despite global excess savings and may reﬂect increased heterogeneity in the
solvency of the banking system. It turns out that the former do not propagate
within the ﬂexible exchange rate system, in accordance with the literature,
whereas both countries suﬀer from the latter, as a reduced demand and credit
rationing cause unemployment to rise while all nominal advantages generally
attributed to the foreign ﬂoating-currency country vanish in this second case.
The paper therefore proposes a new type of ﬁnancial shocks transmitting the
domestic downturn abroad, letting room for an international ﬁnance multiplier,
and consequently fueling a global recession. This result is absent from the
current literature on ﬁnancial contagion as far as large developed economies
within a ﬂoating exchange rate system are considered, and yet highly reminiscent
of the recent crisis. The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives
the set up of the model and characterizes the domestic equilibrium. Section 3
explores the international relationships and the subsequent spillovers of country-
speciﬁc ﬁnancial shocks. In particular, it emphasizes the diﬀerentiated impact
of conﬁdence shocks versus liquidity supply shocks. Section 4 discusses the
contribution vis-a-vis the existing literature, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Set-up of the model and domestic equilibrium
2.1 A sequential search and matching process
Each of the two economies produces one output and is composed of four types
of inﬁnitely-lived agents: ﬁnancial investors, commercial banks, entrepreneurs,
and workers. These agents interact in three (potentially) frictional markets:
the ﬁnancial market, the credit market and the labor market. For simplicity, all
agents are risk-neutral and have the same discount rate, r. I assume a sequential
3multi-bargaining process, with the timing of events given in Figure 1.
In stage 0, commercial banks look for investors in the ﬁnancial market in
order to raise funds before lending to entrepreneurs. Financiers are endowed
with capital but are assumed to have not the competence to generate long-
term investment opportunities. This category can encompass very diﬀerent
actors such as investment banks, hedge funds, foreign sovereign funds, but also
the Central Bank via quantitative easing. On the other hand, I assume that
commercial banks need capital in this stage of the process. That seems to be
particularly realistic in periods when banks have already steep leverage ratios
and hence have to ﬁnd buyers to their outstanding debt before conceding new
loans. One should note that these matches can however been made at inﬁnitely
high rates if investment and commercial banking activities are integrated.






















In stage 1, bankers look for a proﬁtable loan opportunity among entrepreneurs
who seek a credit to create a ﬁrm. Wasmer and Weil (2004) constructed a model
in which such a credit market stage precedes a labor market stage, leading to
a situation where frictions on both markets reinforce one another. Following
them, I assume that entrepreneurs have no proper wealth ex ante and must
ﬁnd a credit before entering the worker recruitment stage. Acemoglu (2001)
indeed argues that credit market frictions signiﬁcantly constrain job creation
for new ﬁrms, especially in Europe. Moreover, credit dependence of ﬁrms may
be particularly relevant when a deep ﬁnancial shock prevents even large ﬁrms
from issuing equities as a perfectly substitutable fund-raising means.1 In stage
2, entrepreneurs and workers look for each other in a usual search and matching
approach. Finally, in stage 3, the newly created ﬁrm produces and pays back
the banker who in turn pays for the former investor’s services.
Considering capital transactions (stage 0) as the beginning of the sequential
process allows representing limited access to liquidity for ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries.2 A recent empirical contribution by Hale and Santos (2010) shows, ﬁrst,
that even US banks that do not rely on the bond market to fund their activi-
ties (but exclusively on deposits) have become exposed to the conditions in the
1Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) found that 86% of constrained US ﬁrms declared
having restrained, canceled or postponed planned investment in attractive projects during the
crisis of 2008, and so did almost half of unconstrained ﬁrms; even stronger results in Europe.
2As funds only come from ﬁnancial operations in this model, we can equally call them liq-
uidities from the standpoint of the banker; however modeling the investor-banker relationship
make them closer to long-term assets on a frictional ﬁnancial market here.
4bond market, and second, that banks pass debt market shocks to all their bor-
rowers, whether these borrowers have themselves access to the bond market or
not. This suggests that a rarefaction of liquidity holders willing to ﬁnance long-
term projects may have harmful consequences for real activity through credit
rationing, even in a world where all agents do not depend on external ﬁnance
to fund their business and where banks can discriminate the creditworthiness of
entrepreneurs addressing them for a loan. The present paper studies real eﬀects
induced by a shock freezing these ﬁnancial relationships, with a signiﬁcant rise
of external capitalization cost to banks stemming from the inability of potential
investors to assess their solvency. If the process would have started at the so-
called stage 1, simulating a shock to an exogenous liquidity access of commercial
banks would be of the same kind than a traditional monetary restriction by the
Central Bank and lead to the counterintuitive results mentioned earlier.
Market quantities within each of the non real production stages — ﬁnancial
funds, credit, employment — are therefore determined as a ﬂow of matches be-
tween both sides of the relevant market. In a standard way (` a la Mortensen and
Pissarides, 1994), the labor market is characterized by a ﬁnite number NU of
unemployed workers looking for a job and a ﬁnite number NV of ﬁrms opening
job vacancies. A constant returns-to-scale matching function mL(NU,NV ) de-
termines the ﬂow of new ﬁrms, i.e. new contracts between one entrepreneur and
one worker. The relative mass of vacancies to unemployed workers deﬁnes the
labor market tightness θ ≡ NV /NU from which are inferred the instantaneous
probabilities qL(θ) = mL(NU,NV )/NV for an entrepreneur to ﬁnd a suitable
worker and θqL(θ) = mL(NU,NV )/NU for a worker to ﬁnd a job.
A recent literature represents the credit market similarly, arguing that infor-
mation asymmetries between borrowers and lenders make the creation of new
credit relationships time- and eﬀort-consuming. As a consequence, there are
some bankers screening for credit applications while a pool of unmatched en-
trepreneurs is waiting for a loan in each period. At a macro level, this cor-
responds to a situation of credit rationing as in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005) and Craig and Haubrich (2006) have sup-
ported this representation of credit markets by providing evidence of a de-
parture of gross from net credit ﬂows persisting over time, that is, coexis-
tent credit creation and credit destruction ﬂows. Therefore, I consider that
the ratio of a mass NE of entrepreneurs looking for a bank to a mass NC of
bankers searching for a desirable loan opportunity measures the credit mar-
ket tightness, denoted φ. A constant returns-to-scale technology, mC(NE,NC),
increasing in both arguments, then determines the instantaneous probabilities
qC(φ) = mC(NE,NC)/NE for an entrepreneur to obtain a loan and φqC(φ) =
mC(NE,NC)/NC for a banker to ﬁnd a real investment opportunity.
Finally, I construct ﬁnancial market relationships similarly here. This does
not preclude the case where ﬁnancial markets are perfectly eﬃcient but simulta-
neously allows for the representation of non-walrasian shocks, i.e. shocks freez-
ing ﬁnancial activities by creating frictions that cannot be immediately cleared
by capital return adjustments. Moreover, this modeling accounts for the time
that elapses between the shock arrival and the restoration of a conﬁdence level
5compatible with a normal functioning of ﬁnancial markets, given heterogeneity
and information asymmetries among participants. Therefore, I suppose that
there are NI ﬁnanciers seeking investment opportunities and NB commercial
banks looking for capital in each period. Their ratio deﬁnes a comparable mea-
sure of the ﬁnancial market tightness, ξ ≡ NB/NI. Total ﬂows are then derived
from a similar matching function mF(NI,NB), which speciﬁes the Poisson time-
varying arrival rates qF(ξ) = mF(NI,NB)/NB at which a banker raises funds on
the ﬁnancial market and ξqF(ξ) = mF(NI,NB)/NI at which an investor meets a
suitable banker. In each market, the matching rate decreases in the tightness on
the demand side (∂qL(θ)/∂θ,∂qC(φ)/∂φ, and ∂qF(ξ)/∂ξ < 0), while the reverse
holds on the supply side (∂θqL(θ)/∂θ,∂φqC(φ)/∂φ, and ∂ξqF(ξ)/∂ξ > 0).
2.2 Individual behaviors
Hereafter are the equilibrium conditions for entrepreneurs, bankers, and ﬁnan-
cial investors resulting from this sequential process, given their proper con-
straints and search activities; proofs are given in Appendix. The setup is such
that it is possible to abstract from the equilibrium condition of workers in the
labor market without loss of generality, since I assume that unemployed workers
accept the job when they encounter a vacancy as long as the wage is suﬃciently
high to allow for consumption, given the goods prices, the discount rate and
the separation rate, i.e. when (w/P)/(r + s) > 0. The intuition lies in the
fact that during ﬁnancial crises the prime concern is involuntary unemployment
associated with credit constraints whatever the labor supply in normal times.
Michaillat (2010) recently found that unemployment is mostly explained by fric-
tions on the labor market when the rate is near to 5% in the US but that this
frictional part falls to less than 2% when the rate goes to 9%, so that the cyclical
component is the quasi-exclusive source of unemployment in bad times.
2.2.1 Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneurs enter the process in stage 1 since it is assumed that they have
productive ideas but not the necessary wealth to start the recruitment stage on
their own, and therefore depend on the credit market to ﬁnance the costs of the
labor recruitment stage. Searching for a loan involves a non-pecuniary ﬂow cost
(eﬀort cost), denoted cE. Once matched with a banker with probability qC(φ),
an entrepreneur starts looking for a suitable worker in stage 2. This implies
a recruitment ﬂow cost γL but not directly borne by entrepreneurs as exactly
oﬀset by the amount borrowed from the bank in the previous stage. In stage 3,
the one entrepreneur-one worker constituted ﬁrm produces one unit of output,
sold at price p which is taken as given by the individual ﬁrm. After paying for
the worker’s wage w, a part ρC of the net proﬁt is used to reimburse the banker.
I assume that the wage rate is exogenous without loss of generality here, whereas
the determination of the repayment rate is discussed further below.
Entrepreneurs optimally decide whether to start looking for a loan in order
to launch a business if their present-discounted expected cash ﬂows in the pro-
6duction stage exceed their present-discounted expected costs while searching for
the loan, given the riskfree rate r and the conditional transition probabilities
determining the expected duration of each stage (qC, qL, and s). Free entry im-
plies that total costs and gains are exactly equalized at equilibrium (zero-proﬁt






p − w − ρC
r + s
(1)
(recursive proﬁt-maximizing problem in Appendix). On the left hand side is
the periodic search cost cE times the average duration of the credit search
stage 1/qC(φ). On the right hand side are the instantaneous proﬁts in stage 3
(p − w − ρC) discounted by the riskfree rate r, the ﬁrm separation rate s, and
the average recruitment duration that depends on the labor market tightness θ.
2.2.2 Bankers
Commercial banks enter the process one stage earlier since they have to raise
funds before lending to entrepreneurs. Let denote cB the periodic non-pecuniary
search cost borne in stage 0 while looking for an investor with excess savings, and
which may stand for the eﬀort made by the bank to gather proofs of its solvency
to this investor for instance. If the match is concluded, the investor provides
the banker with the required capital while searching for a suitable entrepreneur
(ﬂow cost γC) and the amount that will be lent to this entrepreneur. During
the production stage 3, bankers receive ρC from entrepreneurs, from which is
extracted an instantaneous payout to the investor, at (endogenous) rate ρF.











On the left hand side, expected costs of raising funds for bankers depend on
the ﬁnancial market tightness ξ which gives the expected duration of stage 0.
On the right hand side, bankers’ output share (ρC − ρF) is discounted by the
respective duration of the credit and labor search stages.
2.2.3 Financial investors
Similarly, investors pay a non pecuniary search cost cI per period in stage 0,
while searching for a banker they consider able to turn their idle savings into a
proﬁtable long term investment opportunity. When the ﬁnancial market is such
that the instantaneous matching rates of investors and bankers are inﬁnitely
high, this parameter simply drives the liquidity injection in the economy. In
stages 1 and 2, the investors bear the costs γC and γL while banks are screening
credit applications and while entrepreneurs are recruiting. In the production
stage 3, they earn ρF in each period. Finally, they return to stage 0 if a sepa-



















Forward-looking investors’ willingness to enter the sequential process depends on
the costs induced by search activities (γC and γL times the respective expected
search durations) and the present-discounted output share ρF in stage 3.
2.3 Surplus sharing
The two successive rates that drive the surplus sharing between entrepreneurs,
bankers, and investors, ρC and ρF, are determined by Nash bargaining rules
(Pissarides, 2000). The loan repayment rate ρC from the ﬁrm to the banker
thus maximizes the value of the match between the banker and the entrepreneur
ρC = argmax(B2 − B1)δC(E2 − E1)(1−δC)
where B1 and B2 (respectively E1 and E2) are the values of bankers (resp.
entrepreneurs) in stages 1 and 2, and where δC (resp. 1 − δC) is the exoge-
nous bargaining power of bankers (resp. entrepreneurs) in the credit market.
Similarly, the ﬂow ρF from bankers to investors is given by
ρF = argmax(I1 − I0)δF(B1 − B0)(1−δF)
where I0 and I1 are the values of investors in stages 0 and 1, and where δF is
the bargaining power of investors in the ﬁnancial market.
2.4 Domestic equilibrium
The two precedent Nash bargaining rules recursively give the equilibrium value
of the tightness on each of the three frictional markets. First, the rule for ρF,
together with zero-proﬁt conditions for ﬁnancial investors and bankers (I0 = 0







(see Appendix for details). In equilibrium, the ﬁnancial tightness thus depends
on the relative ﬂow costs: the higher is cI, i.e. the costlier it is for an investor to
ﬁnd a commercial bank ceteris paribus, the less likely the former is to enter the
ﬁnancial market, and therefore the tighter is the market as the relative number
of bankers to investors willing to trade NB/NI increases. The same reasoning
holds for the respective bargaining powers δF of investors and (1−δF) of bankers,
with relatively more bankers willing to participate to the ﬁnancial market — a
higher tightness — when (1−δF) is high. This simple result for ¯ ξ will be proved
of particular importance in the international spillovers of shocks later on.
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This expression similarly says that the relative number of entrepreneurs to
bankers is higher when entrepreneurs’ bargaining power in the loan market
is higher. On the contrary, when bankers’ liquidity access is easy (high qF(ξ)),
numerous loan opportunities are provided to entrepreneurs, thus slackening the
credit market tightness. Moreover, while ¯ φ does not directly increase in bankers’
application screening costs γC which are supported by the ﬁnancial investor, it
increases in bankers’ previous costs cB to ﬁnd this former ﬁnancier. Finally, for
r = 0, all potential bankers would be willing to ﬁnance an entrepreneur what-
ever the matching probabilities, consequently driving the market tightness ¯ φ to
zero, whereas with r > 0 a banker decides to enter the credit market if the time
spent in stages 1 and 2 is valuable enough to outweigh the discounting eﬀect of
the riskfree rate given that search activity is costly.
Finally, the steady-state unemployment rate ¯ u equalizes ﬂows into unem-





The recursive system of equations (1)–(6) in six unknowns {θ, φ, ξ, ρC, ρF,
u} characterizes the closed economy. In particular, replacing ¯ ξ (4) and ¯ φ (5)
in (1)–(3) simultaneously gives the equilibrium repayment rates ¯ ρC and ¯ ρF, as








r + ¯ φqC(¯ φ)














from which the steady-state unemployment rate ¯ u is ﬁnally determined by (6).
This equilibrium is depicted in the space formed by the labor market tight-
ness θ and the ﬁnancial market tightness ξ in Figure 2. I could have equally
chosen the (θ,φ) or the (φ,ξ) spaces, but the (θ,ξ) space will be the most interest-
ing for the comparative static analysis of ﬁnancial shocks in the next Section. In
order to represent the three representative agents (entrepreneurs, bankers, and
investors) in this two-dimensional space, equations (1) and (2) are put together
via the equalization of ρC to obtain a joint equilibrium condition for bankers











p − w − ρF
r + s
(BE)
This expression is the downward-sloping curve BE in Figure 2. A high ξ cor-
responds to a high demand for funds from commercial banks relatively to the
available ﬁnancial market supply. Therefore, at a given equilibrium credit mar-
9ket tightness ¯ φ, the tighter the labor market, the slacker the capital access must
be to remain on the same banker-entrepreneur’s joint condition. Conversely a
relatively short duration of stage 2 while looking for a suitable worker can oﬀset
longer durations of the fund-raising stages. The upward-sloping II curve in Fig-
ure 2 stands for the ﬁnancial investors’ condition (3), which states that a tight
ﬁnancial market is required when the labor tightness θ is high. A large ξ in-
creases investors’ instantaneous probability of matching with a suitable banker,
thus reducing the expected duration of search in the ﬁnancial market, in order
to outweigh the fact that stage 2 is time-consuming (θ is high), all other things
equal.3 The intersection between BE and II represents the initial aggregate
equilibrium A of the closed economy, which satisﬁes {¯ θ, ¯ φ, ¯ ξ, ¯ ρC, ¯ ρF, ¯ u}.








After incorporating some additional mechanisms arising with the openness
of the economy, next Section will therefore study the impact of two types of
shocks that may come up in the ﬁnancial market of these stylized economies:
• a shock to cI — the parameter driving liquidity injection in the economy
everything else equal —, interpreted as a liquidity supply shock. Its eﬀects
are comparable to a monetary shock though in the presence of ﬁnancial
accelerators that let room for credit rationing (and thus already diﬀerent
from a traditional monetary shock).
• a shock to cB, which hinders ﬁnancial relationships but arrives despite
excess savings in the economy, and is thus interpreted as a conﬁdence
shock. It may be due to an exogenous change in the degree of heterogeneity
among bankers — or a change in the degree of information asymmetry
about bankers’ characteristics at the expense of liquidity holders.
3In particular, a higher ﬁnancial market tightness always means a higher bank-matching
probability for investors in equilibrium assuming that the level of information asymmetry
about the participants’ creditworthiness is unaltered on average in the long run.
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3.1 International relationships and aggregate constraints
Consumption goods are assumed to be fully internationally mobile. Each econ-
omy is specialized in the production of one good, even though home and foreign
goods can be perfectly substitutable for consumers without changing the model
predictions. Each ﬁrm produces one unit of the good corresponding to its loca-
tion every period during stage 3. The entrepreneur now chooses the respective
parts of his output that will be sold at home and exported in addition to his
search entry decision (1), according to the exchange rate and the competitively
determined prices pih,t and pif,t of his good i (i = h,f) in country j (j = h,f)
at time t, where h and f stands for Home and Foreign henceforth.
Neither the entrepreneurs nor the workers are mobile here. The country-
speciﬁcity of entrepreneurs can be justiﬁed by the inertia in the production re-
locating decisions following unexpected ﬁnancial shocks. In fact, entrepreneurs
could migrate to the foreign country conditional on paying for sunk costs — due
to a change in their production specialization for example — without changing
the model predictions but I do not make this outside option explicit here for
simplicity. Workers, whether employed or not, are supposed immobile since ob-
served labor mobility between large economic areas within the ﬂoating exchange
rate world — think of US and EU — is very limited as compared to labor mo-
bility between countries within each of these areas. This allows to abstract from
a comparable outside option for workers, and to normalize to one each national
working population in order to compare variations in unemployment rates.
As regards commercial bankers, the fact that they lend an indivisible unit
of ﬁnal credit to small and local entrepreneurs also makes them primarily local
because once a banker has contracted with an entrepreneur he de facto belongs
to the same country. Formally, no direct outside option abroad is made explicit
here but the number of potential banks in one country has not to be ﬁxed ex
ante, so that a generalization with initial free entry and free exit worldwide is
possible. Theoretical and empirical literatures have widely documented that ge-
ographical distance between lenders and (potential) borrowers indeed aﬀect loan
decisions. Degryse, Cerqueiro and Ongena (2007) and Agarwal and Hauswald
(2008) recently summarized the two mechanisms through which distance mat-
ters. On the one hand, transportation costs hinder matching between remote
credit market participants: a potential borrower has to spend time and eﬀort
to personally interact with loan oﬃcers or to look for a suitable loan (because
of product diﬀerentiation) while banks endure costs in assessing loan applicants
or in monitoring loans that both increase with physical distance (Sussman and
Zeira, 1995). On the other hand banks’ capacity to collect critical information
about expected returns and probabilities of default of potential borrowers is en-
hanced by proximity, thus encouraging banks to concentrate on a limited geo-
graphical area to beneﬁt from the monopoly power created by this informational
advantage (Hauswald and Marquez, 2006). This results in spatial price discrim-
ination and geographical credit rationing that have been empirically supported
11at a micro level (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2008)
and within a medium size country (Casolaro and Mistrulli, 2008). Although
the generalization at an international level would require a speciﬁc analysis,
two intuitions support it in the present setting. First, if transaction costs and
informational advantages are decisive channels in very limited areas, they are
probably deeper between major areas because additional diﬀerences, in regu-
lation for instance, are likely to prevent from collecting private information or
detecting credit delinquency. Second, both banks and ﬁrms are small ones and
new ones (think of a particular bank agency), two major characteristics for
which the aforementioned channels are particularly strong in this literature.
Finally, ﬁnancial capital is on the contrary perfectly mobile across countries.
The investors holding it therefore need not to be assigned a particular citizen-
ship ex ante, and are free to enter the ﬁnancial search stage in the country where
their intertemporal value, denoted I, is the highest, given the search costs, the
production prices, and the separation rate. Therefore, at equilibrium, it must
be that ¯ Ij = ¯ I for all countries j (j = h,f). This implies that if a shock arrives
investors will choose to relocate their assets in the country where their matching
rate with a commercial bank is the highest, i.e. where the ﬁnancial market is
the tightest (since ∂ξqF(ξ)/∂ξ > 0), ceteris paribus. Equilibrium is thus char-
acterized by a unique ﬁnancial tightness at the world level, that is an integrated
ﬁnancial market with external ﬁnance conditions equalized worldwide.
Given these international relationships, the balance of payments and the
subsequent expression for the exchange rate are set up. The current account of
the home country expressed in domestic currency is standardly written as
CAt ≡ Chf,tSt phf,t − Cfh,tpfh,t
where Cij,t denotes the level of consumption of good i in country j at time t,
and where S is the nominal ﬂoating exchange rate deﬁned as the price of the
domestic currency in terms of the foreign currency. The law of one price is
assumed to always hold, such that the price of the each good at home depends
on its price abroad times the exchange rate: phh,t = St phf,t and pfh,t = St pff,t.
As ﬁnancial investors already matched with a banker cannot immediately
withdraw their invested capital when shocks arise, the deﬁnition of the ﬁnan-
cial account comes down to the inter-country diﬀerence in new investor-banker
relationships, i.e. the diﬀerence of ﬁnancial match ﬂows at home and abroad
FAt ≡ mF(NIt,NBh,t) − mF(NIt,NBf,t)
Re-expressed in terms of matching rates (by deﬁnition, ξiqF(ξi) ≡
mF(NI,NBi)
NI ),
it highlights the importance of the inter-country ﬁnancial market tightness dif-
ferential in driving international capital ﬂows
FAt = NItξh,tqF(ξh,t) − NItξf,tqF(ξf,t)
It is noteworthy that, even if ﬁnancial ﬂows are driven by the ﬁnancial tightness
diﬀerential, the dynamics however will not necessarily lead unmatched investors
12to immediately pour their savings into the foreign market following a shock at
home. In fact, even if they are allowed to do so, general equilibrium eﬀects will
also imply a rarefaction of suitable bankers in the foreign country, and therefore
similar movements of the ﬁnancial tightness abroad. In particular, scarcity of
real business opportunities and internal credit frictions will also be at play in
the foreign economy, with an overall ampliﬁcation stemming from the inertia in
ﬁnancial relationships before a normal level of conﬁdence is restored.
The balance of payments identity CA + FA ≡ 0 ﬁnally gives the expression
for the exchange rate as follows, with time subscripts dropped
S =
pfhCfh − NIξhqF(ξh) + NIξfqF(ξf)
phfChf
(8)
Unsurprisingly, the domestic currency appreciates (S decreases) with exports
and relative ﬁnancial opportunities to capital holders in the home country, while
it depreciates with imports and relative ﬁnancial advantages abroad.
The general equilibrium in the two-country case is now determined by adding
to the previous symmetric set of unknowns for both countries {θh, θf, φh, φf,
ξh, ξf, ρCh, ρCf, ρFh, ρFf, uh, uf} the consumption levels {Chh,Cfh,Chf,Cff},
prices {phh,pfh,phf,pff}, and the exchange rate {S}. Two ﬁrst order conditions
from consumers’ optimization problem, the two laws of one price, two aggregate
constraints on goods, and each country’s resource constraint are added (standard
equations relegated in Appendix), as well as the balance of payments (8).



















This equilibrium is depicted as point A in Figure 3. It includes symmetric
internal equilibria of frictional markets as described in Section 2, with the previ-
ous banker-entrepreneur BE and investor II equilibrium conditions, in the (θ,ξ)
space for each country, Home and Foreign. This point also stands for the ex-
ternal equilibrium whereby the ﬁnancial tightness is equalized worldwide. The
balance of payments BP horizontal line depicts this perfect ﬁnancial market
13integration through which capital ﬂows take advantage of all opportunities.4
Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively study the qualitative impact of each
type of domestic ﬁnancial shocks on both the domestic and the foreign labor
markets characterized in point A. The analytical results will be completed with
comparative statics that remind the traditional IS-LM-BP picture in the repre-
sentation of real-ﬁnancial interactions, while being supported here by the micro-
foundations of the search and matching approach.
3.2 Eﬀect of liquidity supply shocks
Let ﬁrst consider a shock to the liquidity injection parameter cI in Figure 4.
A domestic increase in cI displaces the liquidity holders’ equilibrium condi-
tion IIA
h leftwards, from point A to point B at home. This is associated with
a large relative appreciation of the domestic currency, which further causes a
price-competitiveness recession in the home country (point D). Meanwhile, the
symmetric depreciation abroad boosts the economic activity in the second coun-
try. The reduced demand in the ﬁrst country subsequently generates negative
second-round eﬀects abroad but not large enough to be detrimental to the for-
eigners, since the economy in ﬁne stabilizes at the general equilibrium where
home and foreign ﬁnancial market tightnesses are equalized, that is at point E.
A ﬁnancial multiplier here magniﬁes the impact of the rarefaction of liq-
uidity holders via longer fund-raising stage durations for credit intermediaries.
However, one should note that the international transmission channels do not
qualitatively diﬀer from the literature even in the presence of a ﬁnancial multi-
plier because the solvency of commercial banks was not the source of the shock.
The spillover eﬀect of pure liquidity supply shocks is therefore similar to the one
of traditional monetary shocks, that is negative co-movements between home
and foreign outputs.
The search and matching framework allows to corroborate these compar-
ative statics by simple analytical results. First, let deﬁne the elasticities of
the matching functions at equilibrium as ηL ≡ −q′
L(¯ θ)¯ θ/qL(¯ θ) (labor market),
ηC ≡ −q′
C(¯ φ)¯ φ/qC(¯ φ) (credit market), and ηF ≡ −q′
F(¯ ξ)¯ ξ/qF(¯ ξ) (ﬁnancial
market), with ηL,ηC,ηF ∈ (0,1). Then, loglinearizing the expressions for ¯ ξ,
¯ φ, and ¯ θ around the two-country equilibrium (see Appendix) using the last
notations gives the analytical impacts of asymmetric liquidity supply shocks
summarized in Table 1. A hatted variable denotes the loglinear deviation from
its steady-state value (ˆ x = x−¯ x
¯ x ), and each particular cell in Table 1 indicates
the elasticity of the (loglinearized) market tightness relatively to the shock, i.e.
the value of ∂ˆ ξh/∂ˆ cIh in the northwestern cell for instance.
4The perfect international mobility of ﬁnancial investors assumed here for analytical and
graphical simplicity ensures that ﬁnancial market tightnesses, ξh and ξf, are instantaneously
equalized between countries. If BP were not perfectly horizontal but slightly upward-sloping,
this would not aﬀect the qualitative conclusion even if it may quantitatively reduce the ﬁnan-
cial transmission. In another setting where ﬁnancial investors would be strongly immobile,
portfolio composition eﬀects would substitute to ensure capital mobility, producing similar
contagion eﬀects though via diﬀerent channels (Krugman, 2008, Dedola and Lombardo, 2010).









































The ﬁrst two rows present intuitive results. A negative domestic liquidity
supply shock (a rise in cIh) tightens the ﬁnancial market (row 1) via a nega-
tive wealth eﬀect. As ﬁnanciers are internationally mobile, the same eﬀect is
obtained worldwide. The credit market also tightens in both countries (row 2)
because less capitalized banks are able to ﬁnance a given mass of entrepreneurs,
hence φ rises. However, the literature puzzle appears here as the home and for-
eign labor markets present opposite responses to the shock in row 3 (assuming
that the elasticity in the southwestern cell is negative, see Appendix for details).
Further loglinearization of (6) makes clear that unemployment decreases in the
labor market tightness in a given country, as
ˆ u ≈ −(1 − ηL)(1 − ¯ u)ˆ θ
while output increases in the labor market tightness since output is proportional
in employment in each country. Therefore, the unemployment rate increases
in the country where the negative liquidity supply shock arrives but decreases
abroad. Note that the magnitude of the eﬀect does not depend on the consumer
preference parameters and thus even a strong national consumption bias does
not question the present transmission channels.
There is a striking paradox in the fact that these results are in line with the
literature but counterintuitive as regards the recent ﬁnancial crisis since they
predict that an expansion prevails in the foreign economic area when a reces-
sion hits the ﬁrst area within a ﬂexible exchange rate system. This is simply
the reverse case of an expansive ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ monetary policy or com-
petitive devaluations by which short-term booms are expected at the expense
15Table 1: Elasticity to asymmetric liquidity supply shocks at home and abroad
Tightness Home country Foreign country
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γLηL(1 − ¯ NI)(1 − ηF)
+
γC(1−ηC)ηF
¯ φhqC(¯ φh) − (1 − ¯ NI)(1 − ηF)
o
of trading partners in the literature. As far as monetary shocks are concerned
in open DSGE models, the early Mundell-Fleming negative comovements of
home and foreign outputs are conﬁrmed, and thus no international ﬁnancial
contagion can emerge without resorting either to ﬁxed exchange rates or to ﬁ-
nancial market incompleteness (ﬁnancial asset complementarity) when neither
can hold for developed-country interactions. Note again that the standard re-
sults are conﬁrmed here despite the presence of ﬁnancial multiplier mechanisms.
This potentially explains why the literature on international contagion within
a ﬂoating exchange rate system has not integrated more sophisticated ﬁnancial
channels, or on the contrary, why the credit constraints literature has focused on
closed economy or monetary union settings. The present setup conﬁrms that in-
corporating ﬁnancial multipliers into existing models is not suﬃcient to account
for positive output comovements as long as liquidity shocks are concerned.
3.3 Eﬀect of conﬁdence shocks
In order to let room for international transmission of ﬁnancial shocks, the present
paper argues for considering ﬁnancial shocks of a diﬀerent nature, departing
from the walrasian perspective in the sense that they prevent interest rate move-
ments to immediately clear the market: let call them conﬁdence shocks. Hence,
let now consider in Figure 5 a shock to the search cost cB of banks in the fund-
raising stage. One can imagine that bank capitalization is suddenly costlier
because higher (real or perceived) heterogeneity in the banking sector requires
either that banks make a sustained eﬀort to gather the proofs of their credit-
worthiness to investors and/or that they bear a higher opportunity cost in the
climate of mistrust due to prohibitive information asymmetry to investors.
Graphically, this shock to cB simultaneously shifts the BEh and the IIh
curves to the left. Zero-proﬁt conditions directly imply that the number of banks
willing to enter decreases with a higher liquidity search cost cB, and so does
the number of credit-constrained entrepreneurs. The number of investors also
contracts because it becomes indirectly more diﬃcult to ﬁnd a suitable banker.
Let suppose for the moment that the entry condition of investors is less aﬀected
by the deteriorated matching with bankers than the one of bankers directly is
through the shock (added to the one of entrepreneurs which is subsequently
aﬀected through credit rationing). Then the displacement of the BEA
h curve to
16BEC
h is larger than the one of the IIA
h curve to IIE
h , thus driving to point C
where the domestic currency slightly tends to depreciate.
This exchange rate movement creates potential export opportunities for the
rare but yet newly created ﬁrms — resulting from entrepreneurs’ successful
match with the remaining banks in the home country —, displacing BEC
h to
BED
h . Meanwhile, the relative appreciation of the foreign currency induced by
the ﬁnancial distrust on domestic banks, combined with the domestic reces-
sion, damages the situation of foreign entrepreneurs by narrowing their export
possibilities (BED
f ). The situation is then aggravated abroad by the fact that
global investors choose not to pour their savings into the foreign economy, even
if the match with commercial bankers would comparatively be easier, because of
weakest business opportunities magniﬁed by internal credit frictions. The for-
eign country is therefore kept away from new leverage facilities. It results that
the deteriorated foreign labor market (in BEE
f ) in turn worsens the situation
of the ﬁrst country by restraining international trade opportunities despite the
positive exchange rate ﬂuctuation at home. These negative second-round eﬀects
ﬁnally lead to the internal-external equilibrium E in Figure 5.









































Three lessons can be drawn. First, the domestic labor market tightness is
far lower from its initial level (θA
h ), and therefore the domestic unemployment
rate far higher. Investors’ decision to exit the ﬁnancial market when banking
heterogeneity rises in turn forces more banks to exit the market because the rar-
efaction of funds adds to the fact that their search for funds was already costlier.
This eﬀect is itself passed on entrepreneurs — whatever their productivity level
— and the three frictions reinforce one another creating internal ﬁnancial accel-
erator mechanisms in the home country. Second, the unemployment rate also
17goes up in the foreign country, which did not directly experience the ﬁnancial
distress but ends up absorbing part of the consequences that would have oth-
erwise impacted the home country, despite the ﬂexible exchange rate regime.
The ﬁnancial disruption thus causes a worldwide downturn, but real adverse
eﬀects are tempered by global interactions in the ﬁrst area while transmitted
to the other zone. Last but not least, these overall eﬀects are concomitant to a
slackening of the ﬁnancial tightness at the world level (global excess savings) in
spite of the negative asymmetric ﬁnancial shock. This conﬁrms that the nature
of the shock is diﬀerent from a standard monetary contraction in DSGE models.
A last question naturally arises: what if the initial displacement of the IIh
curve had been relatively larger than the ﬁrst displacement of the BEh curve,
leading to a point C above the BP line? Then there would be a slight ap-
preciation of the domestic currency, but both far reduced if compared to the
traditional framework and whose eﬀects are mitigated by the dynamic interac-
tions between a frictional ﬁnancial market constraining commercial banks on
the one hand and a frictional credit market constraining real activity on the
other hand. Therefore, the depreciation of the foreign currency is not suﬃcient
to oﬀset the initial harmful impact created by the massive exit of banks and the
consequent credit frictions while the traditional price-competitiveness channel
turns out to be insigniﬁcant, thus producing similar conclusions.
The analytical version is summarized in Table 2. The ﬁrst row indicates
that the ﬁnancial tightness is lower, i.e. there is global excess liquidity, after
the shock to cB: the fact that ﬁnanciers do not want to capitalize commercial
banks anymore does not come from fewer available funding but from a disrup-
tion of their conﬁdence about bankers’ solvency. The second row reﬂects credit
rationing worldwide as in the case of liquidity supply shocks (the magnitude
only diﬀers by the elasticity of the ﬁnancial market to both types of shocks).
Finally, home and foreign labor market tightnesses, and therefore home and
foreign outputs, appear here with positive comovements as one would expect.
Table 2: Elasticity to asymmetric conﬁdence shocks at home and abroad
Tightness Home country Foreign country
ˆ ξ −1 −1
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Two major stylized facts in 2008-9 seem to validate that this new type of
shocks — interpreted as conﬁdence disruptions — is more relevant than the
traditional liquidity supply shock type. First, the real eﬀects of the US ﬁnancial
crisis were indeed transmitted to the Eurozone in a dampened way despite the
ﬂexible euro-dollar exchange rate: the unemployment rate increased by 111%
in the US between February, 2008 and October, 2009 while it rose by 36% in
18the Eurozone in the same period.5 Second, a sharp contraction in international
trade spread in a context of lesser exchange rate volatility as compared to the
pre- and post-crisis periodes: annual exports of goods fell by 18% in value in
the US in 2009 from 2008 and by 23% in the Eurozone in the same period.6
3.4 Quantitative Evaluation
This subsection estimates the magnitude of international spillovers resulting
from both types of ﬁnancial shocks, and conﬁrms the model predictions in light
of the recent events. As most of the ﬁnancial parameters considered in this new
approach lack of empirical counterparts, they are chosen so that steady-state
values are realistic, while discussion about micro measures and interpretation
of these missing parameters could constitute further research. The calibration
of labor markets is mainly standard and kept as simple as possible here.7
















where µF, µC, and µL, stand for matching eﬃciency measures in the ﬁnancial
market, credit market, and labor market, respectively. On the ﬁnancial and
credit markets, let assume that this eﬃciency parameter is normalized to unity,
that the tightness elasticity of the matching functions is 0.5, and that the bar-
gaining powers of investors and bankers which characterize the Nash bargaining
rules, δC and δF, are also equal to 0.5. On the labor market, the tightness
elasticity ηL is set up to 0.66, as I will also assume that two third of the surplus
is earned by workers at equilibrium, in order to be consistent with the Hosios
rule. The matching eﬃciency on the labor market is allowed to vary between
1.1 and 1.5, a range around Shimer (2005)’s estimation at 1.355. The quarterly
separation rate is 0.1 and the riskless rate is 0.05.
For the moment, let see what the equilibrium labor market tightness —
and therefore the equilibrium unemployment rate — would be with moderate
ﬁnancial frictions and moderate credit frictions. Hence, I suppose that ﬂow
costs on the ﬁnancial market, cI and cB, are both at 0.1 so that the equilibrium
tightness in (4) is equal to 1. With an entrepreneurs’ non pecuniary cost cE
at 0.005, the equilibrium credit market tightness is then also equal to 1 by (5).
Finally, the ﬂow cost γC of bankers screening credit applications is equally set
to 0.1. With a ﬂow cost γL of job vacancies at 1.5, it results by (7) and (6) that
the predicted unemployment rates are 4.68% when µL = 1.5 (highly eﬃcient
5From 4.8% in February, 2008 to 10.1% in October, 2009 in the US, and from 7.2% to 9.8%
in the same period in the Eurozone. Source: Eurostat.
6From 1,277 billions of US dollars in 2008 to 1,046 billions in 2009 for the US, and from
2,312 billions of US dollars to 1,791 billions for the Eurozone. Source: OECD.
7For speciﬁc discussions about the quantitative performance of the search and matching
modeling of labor markets for macroeconomic analysis, see Yashiv, 2009 or Cardullo, 2010.
19labor market), and 7.26% when µL = 1.1 (lower structural eﬃciency). These
are particularly close to the pre-crisis rates in the US and in the Eurozone,
which were respectively at 4.8% and 7.2% in February, 2008.
Now let consider a more realistic initial situation in which unemployment
rates are of similar magnitude but in a context where banks ﬁnd liquidities at
very high rates, whereas entrepreneurs are indeed moderately credit constrained.
In other words, the steady-state is re-parameterized in order to make a distinc-
tion between the credit market, where the information about entrepreneurs’
creditworthiness is not immediately available to bankers, on the one hand and
the ﬁnancial market, where banker-investor relationships are essentially fric-
tionless in normal times, on the other hand. Assuming that investors’ and
bankers’ bargaining powers on the ﬁnancial market are now δF = 0.995 and
(1 − δF) = 0.005 respectively, with unchanged values for the search costs
(cI = cB = γC = 0.1), it results from (4) that bankers now raise funds im-
mediately as the Poisson rate at which they match with a ﬁnancier (qF(ξ)) is
now 14 times larger. This can be interpreted as the existence of large excess
savings in the pre-crisis equilibrium, modeled here by much more ﬁnancial in-
vestors initially entering the process. The credit tightness remains at 1, implying
that entrepreneurs’ ﬂow cost must now equal 0.00035 from (5). Therefore, with
γL = 0.5, the initial unemployment rates are now evaluated at 4.94% and 7.66%
(when µL = 1.5 and µL = 1.1 respectively), that is, quite close to the previous
numbers. This veriﬁes that the model is quantitatively able to reproduce fric-
tionless ﬁnancial markets in normal times, and therefore to evaluate the impact
of the shocks from a realistic starting equilibrium.
In order to stay consistent with the symmetry of the model, the average
labor market eﬃciency (µL = 1.355) is used to compare the quantitative im-
pact of the diﬀerent ﬁnancial shocks from a unique initial unemployment rate at
5.72%. The elasticity of the labor market tightnesses to liquidity supply shocks
are thus evaluated at −0.82 at home while +0.19 abroad. In line with the
qualitative analysis, it conﬁrms the literature negative co-movements between
domestic and foreign responses, in opposition to the recent events. In the case
of conﬁdence shocks, the elasticities respectively become −0.44 and −0.19, im-
plying that this type of shocks is transmitted across countries.8 In terms of
unemployment rate, the response to negative conﬁdence shocks is +0.0083 in
the country where the shock arrives while +0.0036 in the foreign country. These
numbers are not directly interpretable since there is no data equivalence for the
parameters driving the conﬁdence shock. However, they allow to evaluate the
magnitude of the contagion, as they indicate that the relative unemployment ef-
fect is 2.3 times bigger in the home country. On the period from February 2008
to October 2009, the relative increase in unemployment rate has been about
three times larger in the US than in the Eurozone (see previous footnote 5).
The gap with the model predictions could be explained by a distinct degree
of (de-)compartmentalization between ﬁnancial and commercial banks between
the two economic areas that the model does not capture. Another asymmetry
8Both ﬁnancial shocks have the same negative real eﬀect at the world level (−0.63).
20lies in the labor market structures beyond the matching eﬃciency parameter
considered here, for instance higher ﬁring costs may have further dampened the
response of unemployment in the Eurozone. Finally, diﬀerences in monetary
and ﬁscal policies implementation during the crisis are still to incorporate. The
model thus reproduces the US-Eurozone ﬁnancial contagion that characterized
the last ﬁnancial crisis but was not reproduced in the standard frameworks.
4 Discussion
This Section relates the present results to three separate bodies of literature and
highlights the novelty of the contribution. First, although this paper has ac-
counted for a ﬁnancial multiplier by which credit constrained ﬁrms overreact to
a change in borrowing conditions from commercial banks (Bernanke and Blin-
der, 1989, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999, Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997), it
has showed that this is yet not suﬃcient to make international transmission of
ﬁnancial crises emerge. The representation of credit frictions has adopted here
the tractable formalizations in a closed-economy setting of Den Haan, Ramey
and Watson (2003) and Wasmer and Weil (2004), but the analysis of liquidity
supply shocks has indicated that a trivial extension of such a mechanism to an
open-economy framework does not solve the puzzle embedded in the traditional
open macro predictions within a ﬂoating exchange rate system. The combina-
tion of non-walrasian shocks ` a la Wasmer and Weil (2004) and ﬁnancial markets
integration is however decisive.
More generally, this paper has demonstrated that introducing speciﬁc ﬁnan-
cial relationships in an international macro model alters the standard contagion
mechanisms. Major recent two-country frameworks reached the same conclu-
sions than the early Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch models as far as monetary
shocks were concerned because they ignored that ﬁnancial frictions caused by
information asymmetry and agent heterogeneity create potential occurrence of
non-walrasian shocks. As very recently reminded by Boivin, Kiley and Mishkin
(2010), “the core channels of policy transmission (...) have remained steady
from early policy-oriented models to modern DSGE models” while “in contrast,
non-neoclassical channels, such as credit-based channels, have remained outside
the core models.” In particular, they added that the exchange rate channel was
the sole neoclassical channel resulting from the openness of the economy.
For instance, the well-known model by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) that no-
tably provided the Keynesian analysis with microeconomic foundations in a
two-country model lead to counterintuitive results in light of the recent events
when concluding that monetary expansions in one country imply negative co-
movements between home and foreign outputs because of exchange rate ﬂuc-
tuations. In their own words, following a unilateral increase in home money
supply, “the world real interest rate falls and world demand rises, but because
the domestic currency depreciates, some world demand is shifted toward home
products at foreign producers’ expense. (...) A similar ambiguity is familiar
21from two-country versions of the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model.”9
Later improvements of the Obstfeld-Rogoﬀ monopolistic competition frame-
work did not change the predictions; Betts and Devereux (2000a, 2000b) in-
cluded local price stickiness to depart from the law of one price hypothesis,
and conﬁrmed the negative output co-movement induced by monetary shocks,
as well as ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ eﬀects in terms of welfare, in the presence of
pricing-to-market. Even more surprisingly, one-area estimated models used until
very recently by the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank similarly
featured that monetary contractions lead to signiﬁcant and persistent nomi-
nal and real appreciations of the domestic currency (for e.g. Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995) for the US, Smets and Wouters (2003) for the Eurozone). This
implies in a two-country world that ﬁnancial market disruptions at home —
represented through monetary contractions in those frameworks — beneﬁt the
second country, in strike opposition to the 2008 episode.
The few existing two-country papers that had introduced more sophisti-
cated monetary mechanisms remained in a ﬁxed exchange rate case and thus
eluded the issue of the US-Eurozone ﬁnancial contagion. For instance, Gilchrist,
Hairault and Kempf (2002) constructed a two-country model where a ﬁnancial
multiplier is at work but in the context of a monetary union; more recently
Devereux and Yetman (2010) studied the international transmission of shocks
when investors are highly levered in one country but eluded here again the ques-
tion of the exchange rate regime, and did not represent the labor market whose
interactions with ﬁnancial variables are of crucial interest to the real economy.
Aside from this macro part of the literature on international contagion, other
papers have attempted to account for the complexity of modern ﬁnancial interre-
lations but relying on the incompleteness of ﬁnancial markets in the countries to
which crises are transmitted. This representation has been commonly adopted
to study the eﬀect of shocks from developed to emerging market economies,
from the famous paper by Allen and Gale (2000) — underlying the claims that
banking systems have on one another due to regional incompleteness of ﬁnancial
markets as observable in Asia or in the US in the late nineteenth century — to
sudden stops in capital ﬂows (Calvo, Izquierdo and Mej´ ıa, 2004) and the current
evidence about recoupling movements with US ﬁnancial circumstances for large
and prolonged US ﬁnancial distress (Dooley and Hutchison, 2009).
Recent papers following this approach to explain the last ﬁnancial crisis prop-
agation have highlighted the weakening of the international trade based mech-
anism in global eﬀects but still cannot account for the transmission channels to
external developed economies. In the partial equilibrium model by Krugman
(2008) notably, highly leveraged institutions hold domestic and foreign assets,
9The authors reserve the term ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ for welfare implications across coun-
tries, and explain that uncooperative eﬀects on utility disappear in a dynamic setting because
foreigners “enjoy more leisure, improved terms of trade, and consumption higher than in-
come” when their output falls in the short run. However it may be likely that, for a large
and prolonged disruption, individuals perceive more disutility from reduced consumption and
potential unemployment than utility from leisure, so that I restrain the term to output (unem-
ployment) variations throughout this paper. Anyway, this semantic use does not change the
main focus that is the positive correlation between outputs versus negative in the literature.
22and international cross-holding is thus the main propagation channel. But as
far as developed countries are concerned, it is more likely that highly integrated
ﬁnancial structures make domestic and foreign assets substitutes rather than
complements, and that the equalization of external ﬁnance premia across coun-
tries is instead the source of international propagation.
Dedola and Lombardo (2009) thus developed a two-country general equilib-
rium model, where “ﬁnancial and real interdependence can be very strong even
with minimal balance sheet exposure to foreign risky assets, if asset markets
are integrated across the board”. Yet, they also need a minimum level of asset
cross-holdings even in the presence of internal ﬁnancial accelerators to prop-
agate the ﬁnancial disruption. The current paper has thus taken a diﬀerent
approach, by assuming that leveraged banks issue equities on perfectly inte-
grated ﬁnancial markets, in order to prove that there is room for international
contagion without relying on cross-holdings eﬀects. Home and foreign ﬁnancial
assets are considered as perfect substitutes here, which is likely to be the case
for Euro and US ﬁnancial assets. In particular, this means that interest rate
distributions are comparable even though there may exist a home bias in equity
or bond portfolio as suggested by Coeurdacier, Kollman, and Martin (2010).
In its methodological aspects, my paper has used the search and match-
ing modeling to represent frictions in diﬀerent markets. Kiyotaki and Wright
(1993) and Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (1998) adopted the Mortensen and Pis-
sarides (1994) formalization to deal with rationing in monetary and credit mar-
kets. The further theoretical developments for macroeconomic purposes (Was-
mer and Weil, 2004) have provided the foundations for the closed-economy ver-
sion of the economy presented here, while some empirical papers (Dell’Ariccia
and Garibaldi, 2005, and Craig and Haubrich, 2006) have supported this repre-
sentation of credit market frictions.
Three major advantages of this approach have been revealed here. On prac-
tical grounds, it has allowed for a particularly tractable model while introducing
a ﬁnancial market and considering a two-country model where both home and
foreign variables are endogenized. Second, it has pointed out that liquidity
market disruptions are sudden while restoring conﬁdence between investors and
banks as well as between banks and credit borrowers is time consuming, due to
heterogeneity and informational asymmetries, thus creating a period of time in
which the reinforcement between ﬁnancial, credit and labor market frictions is
economically painful. Third, this modeling has permitted to depart from tra-
ditional monetary shocks to represent shocks of a diﬀerent nature, for which
interest rate adjustments cannot immediately clear the market. The study of
non walrasian ﬁnancial shocks has provided new interesting insights in terms of
ﬁnancial tightness and exchange rate dynamics conducive to crisis propagations.
5 Conclusion
This paper has constructed a tractable multi-frictional model whereby an asym-
metric ﬁnancial shock is transmitted between major economic areas with com-
23plete ﬁnancial markets and within a ﬂoating exchange rate regime.
On the one hand, it nests a standard result of the literature — from the
early Mundell-Fleming models to the DSGE recently used by Central Banks —
by predicting a negative correlation between home and foreign outputs follow-
ing asymmetric liquidity supply shocks, even in the presence of internal ﬁnan-
cial accelerators. Therefore, it provides plausible reasons why the international
macroeconomic literature — whether neoclassic or including real markets im-
perfections — has not been integrated into the literature on ﬁnancial frictions
and sophisticated monetary transmission mechanisms, and vice versa, so far.
On the other hand, it argues that another type of ﬁnancial shocks, namely
conﬁdence shocks, does generate international propagation in otherwise similar
contexts. This is permitted via the application of the search and matching ap-
proach, that allows representing perfectly eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets in normal
times but frozen ﬁnancial markets when heterogeneity and information asym-
metry create mistrust about the solvency of fund-raising credit intermediaries.
Thus it helps understanding how ﬁnancial market integration forms an inter-
national transmission channel of ﬁnancial shocks, without resorting to ﬁxed
exchange rates or to portfolio eﬀects.
Several improvements to this framework could constitute further research.
First, the model could be inserted in a fully dynamic setup whereby the resources
of ﬁnancial investors are no more an exogenous endowment but are driven by
saving decisions of the diﬀerent agents. This is likely to make entrepreneurs
less dependent from ﬁnancial intermediaries for recruitment when the credit
constraint is binding, but also to amplify the impact and the persistence of
unexpected ﬁnancial shocks by reducing the willingness to save and invest in
risky assets. Second, it would be interesting to allow for more than one-to-one
relationships and study size eﬀects on diﬀerent agent types, whether ﬁrms or
ﬁnanciers. In particular, crossed ﬁnancial relationships between countries could
add to the propagation of ﬁnancial shocks.
Finally, monetary policy implications will be of main interest. The ﬁnancial
contagion studied here is basically the one that prevails before policy inter-
ventions, and Central Banks are not given a proper role besides being liquid-
ity providers through quantitative easing operations. Introducing an interbank
market along with the present frictional ﬁnancial market would both diversify
liquidity access to banks and confer a more realistic role to monetary authori-
ties. In a two-country framework, positive externalities could then emerge and
replace the standard ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ monetary policy instruments.
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A Optimal Consumptions and the Price Index





where Ci,t denotes the individual consumption level in country i (i = h,f) at
time t, E0 is the mathematical expectation conditional on information available
27at time 0, and 0 < β = (1 + r)−1 < 1 is the common discount factor. Utility is
assumed linear in consumption in order to analyze speciﬁc ﬁnancial transmission
channels independently of risk aversion eﬀects. The consumption level Ci,t is a














where Cji,t stands for the consumption level of good j (j = h,f) in country i
(i = h,f) at time t, and λ is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between
home and foreign goods. Note that the results hold for any particular value for
this degree of substitution between home and foreign aggregate outputs.
Workers’ budget constraint in the home country is simply w = phhChh +
pfhCfh, where w is the wage. For tractability, it is considered that only workers
consume but all types of agents could equally consume with similar results. The





































(Λ) : w = phhChh + pfhCfh




α(phh)1−λ + (1 − α)(pfh)1−λ and ¯ Cfh =
(1 − α)w(pfh)
−λ
α(phh)1−λ + (1 − α)(pfh)1−λ
The Consumption-Based Price Index is deﬁned as the least expenditure that
buys a unit of the consumption index on which period utility depends (Obst-
feld and Rogoﬀ, 1996). It is computed here by ﬁrst substituting these optimal
consumption levels in the initial consumption function, and then replacing the
instantaneous available income w by the index, denoted P, while equalizing C







hh + (1 − α)(pfh)1−λ
￿ λ−1
λ + (1 − α)
1
λ
￿ (1 − α)Ph(pfh)−λ
αp1−λ




Rearranging gives the solution for P in the home country
Ph = [αp
1−λ
hh + (1 − α)(pfh)1−λ]
1
1−λ
The foreign price index expressed in domestic currency, StPf,t, is constructed
similarly but does not need to equal Ph,t as preferences parameters (α and λ)
are allowed to diﬀer from one country to another. Note that the consumption-
based price index is taken as given by a particular consumer since markets for
28ﬁnal goods are competitive, but is endogenous at the aggregate level.
B Individual behaviors and domestic equilibrium
B.1 Workers-Consumers
The worker-consumer problem is given here for general equilibrium understand-
ing but the international propagation mechanisms are primarily driven by inter-
actions between investors, bankers and entrepreneurs in the simpliﬁed sequential
representation. In each period, workers are either unemployed and earn no rev-
enue (in stage 2) or working for a given wage w that allows for consumption (in
stage 3).10 When an unemployed worker encounters an entrepreneur whose job
oﬀer matches his or her characteristics, he or she can either reject the oﬀer and
wait for a new job opportunity or accept the oﬀer and earn w until an adverse
shock arrives. Worker-entrepreneur relationships end at the exogenous separa-
tion rate s. Hence, the optimal stochastic value function Wi,t of an unemployed







U(∗) + β(1 − s)W3i,t+1 + βsW2i,t+1
)
;
β [1 − θi,tqL(θi,t)]W2i,t+1 + β θi,tqL(θi,t)W3i,t+1
)
(∗) s.t. wi = phh,tChi,t + St pff,tCfi,t
where W2 and W3 are the value functions of workers in the respective stages 2
and 3 of the process described above, and where pji,t is the price of good j in
country i and expressed in country i currency at time t.
The consumption index obtained above (Appendix A) allows re-expressing
the individual budget constraint as wi,t = Pi,t ¯ Ci,t, where ¯ Ci,t is the optimal
consumption basket in country i at date t. Therefore, dropping time and country
subscripts, the simpliﬁed Bellman equations for a worker in the successive stages
of the sequential process are




+ s(W2 − W3)
10Unemployment beneﬁts, minimal consumption levels while being unemployed, job search
costs for workers or valuation of leisure activities could have been added to the framework
but none is critical for the current purpose.
29B.2 Entrepreneurs
A similar problem for the entrepreneurs gives the following Bellman equations
rE1 = −cE + qC(φ)(E2 − E1)
rE2 = −γL + γL + qL(θ)(E3 − E2)
rE3 = p − w − ρC + s(E4 − E3)
with E1, E2, E3 the respective intertemporal values of entrepreneurs in stages 1,
2 and 3, cE the search cost in stage 1, and γL the search cost in the recruitment
stage (oﬀset by the amount borrowed from the bank).
B.3 Bankers
Similarly, for the commercial banks,
rB0 = −cB + qF(ξ)(B1 − B0)
rB1 = −γC + γC + φqC(φ)(B2 − B1)
rB2 = −γL + γL + qL(θ)(B3 − B2)
rB3 = ρC − ρF + s(B4 − B3)
where cB and γC stand for bankers’ search costs in stage 0 and stage 1 respec-
tively, and where γL is oﬀset by the capital provided by the investor.
B.4 Investors
Similarly, for the ﬁnancial investors, with cI their search cost in stage 0,
rI0 = −cI + ξ qF(ξ)(I1 − I0)
rI1 = −γC + φqC(φ)(I2 − I1)
rI2 = −γL + qL(θ)(I3 − I2)
rI3 = ρF + s(I4 − I3)
B.5 Domestic Equilibrium
Free entry implies that, in equilibrium, E1 = 0, B0 = 0, and I0 = 0. The ﬁrst
Bellman equation for each agent therefore gives their respective backward value
one stage after entering the process as follows












Free exit (E4 = 0, B4 = 0, and I4 = 0) similarly gives the value in stage 3
from the last Bellman equation in each group. Forward values for stages 1 and
2 are then obtained recursively as
For entrepreneurs E3 =

























Equalizing the backward and forward values for each agent ﬁnally gives their
respective equilibrium condition (1) to (3). The Nash bargaining rule for the
repayment ρF, (1 − δF)(I1 − I0) = δF(B1 − B0), together with the backward






Recursively, the second Nash bargaining rule for the repayment ρC, (1−δC)(B2−
B1) = δC(E2−E1), together with the values of the agents at the time they meet









Solving (1) to (5) gives the equilibrium labor market tightness ¯ θ in (7)
B.6 Impact of Financial Shocks (Closed Economy)
The three equilibrium market tightnesses (4), (5), and (7) are loglinearized as
ˆ ξ = ˆ cI − ˆ cB






− [(1 − ηF)ˆ cB + ηF ˆ cI]¯ κ −
¯ γCˆ γC
¯ φqC(¯ φ)




















(1 − ηC)¯ γC
¯ φqC(¯ φ)
and with ¯ r = 0
31where a hatted variable denotes the loglinear deviation from its steady-state
value (ˆ x = x−¯ x
¯ x ), and where ηL,ηC,ηF ∈ (0,1) are the respective matching func-
tion elasticities at equilibrium (ηL ≡ −q′
L(¯ θ)¯ θ/qL(¯ θ), ηC ≡ −q′
C(¯ φ)¯ φ/qC(¯ φ),
and ηF ≡ −q′
F(¯ ξ)¯ ξ/qF(¯ ξ)). Loglinearizing (6) further gives the unemployment
rate response as ˆ u ≈ −(1 − ηL)(1 − ¯ u)ˆ θ. Note that ¯ κ is assumed positive with
plausible values of the parameters henceforth so that negative ﬁnancial shocks
realistically raise the unemployment rate in the closed economy.
C International Set-up and Financial Spillovers
C.1 Aggregate constraints
Each ﬁrm of country i produces one unit of the good in which the economy is
specialized (i = h,f) and maximizes proﬁts by determining the optimal division
of this output unit between domestic sales Cih,t and exports Cif,t, taking prices
pih,t and pif,t and the exchange rate St as given.
In the two-country case, the equilibrium condition (1) for entrepreneurs in






pihCih + SpifCif − wi − ρCi
r + si
With a labor force normalized to one and one unit produced per ﬁrm, the
instantaneous output of country i is merely its contemporaneous employment
rate (1 − ui,t). This gives four aggregate constraints on goods as
(1 − ui,t) = Cih,t + Cif,t, i = h,f
Moreover, in each period the country-speciﬁc income is either devoted to
the pecuniary costs induced by search activities or consumed in the home and
foreign goods. Assuming for simplicity that output and search costs are constant
through time, the resource constraints expressed in domestic currency are
pih,tCih,t + Stpif,tCif,t − γCNCi,t − γLNEi,t = phh,tChi,t + Stpff,tCfi,t
where the equilibrium values of NC and NE are respectively obtained when ﬂows
of bankers and entrepreneurs into and out of the search process are equalized
(1 − NCi)si = φiqC(φi)NCi and (1 − NEi)si = qL(θi)NEi
Similarly, the ratio of unmatched global ﬁnancial investors at equilibrium is thus
¯ NI =
¯ sh + ¯ sf
¯ sh + ¯ sf + ¯ ξhqF(¯ ξh) + ¯ ξfqF(¯ ξf)
and roughly captures the amount of global excess liquidity at time t.
32C.2 Impact of Financial Shocks (Two-Country case)
Just as in the closed economy case, solving loglinear (open-economy) versions
of equations (1)–(3), replacing ˆ ξi = ˆ cIi − ˆ cBi and ˆ φi = (1 − ηF)ˆ cBi + ηFˆ cIi,
and further simplifying ˆ γCi = ˆ γLi = ˆ cEi = ˆ wi = ˆ s = ˆ r = 0, give the following






¯ Chh(ˆ phh + ˆ Chh) + ¯ S¯ phf
¯ Chf(ˆ S + ˆ phf + ˆ Chf) − [(1 − ηF)ˆ cBh + ηF ˆ cIh]¯ κh
o










(1 − ηC)¯ γCh
¯ φhqC(¯ φh)
i
Then, loglinearizing the expression for the exchange rate (8) and given that
¯ ξhqF(¯ ξh) ¯ NI = (1 − ¯ NI)¯ sh, we have
¯ S¯ phf ¯ Chf(ˆ S + ˆ phf + ˆ Chf) = ¯ pfh ¯ Cfh(ˆ pfh + ˆ Cfh) − ¯ sh(1 − ¯ NI)(1 − ηF)(ˆ ξh − ˆ ξf)






¯ Chh(ˆ phh + ˆ Chh) − ¯ sh(1 − ¯ NI)(1 − ηF)(ˆ cIh − ˆ cBh − ˆ cIf + ˆ cBf)
+¯ pfh
¯ Cfh(ˆ pfh + ˆ Cfh) − [(1 − ηF)ˆ cBh + ηF ˆ cIh]¯ κh
o
Finally, loglinearizing consumers’ budget constraint as
¯ phh ¯ Chh(ˆ phh + ˆ Chh) + ¯ pfh ¯ Cfh(ˆ pfh + ˆ Cfh) = ¯ w ˆ w
and given that ˆ w = 011, the labor market tightness simpliﬁes to




(1−ηF)ˆ cBh +ηFˆ cIh
i
¯ κh +¯ sh(1− ¯ NI)(1−ηF)(ˆ cIh −ˆ cBh −ˆ cIf +ˆ cBf)
o
where the ﬁrst member in curly brackets is the direct ﬁnancial transmission
channel while the second is the expenditure-switching channel resulting from
real exchange rate variations. The labor market tightness responses to asym-
metric liquidity supply shocks at home and abroad are therefore respectively
11This simpliﬁcation stems from the fact that workers’ wage is exogenous in the model. Be-
sides composition changes due to exchange rate variations following negative ﬁnancial shocks
(cIi and cBi), consumption will be thus reduced via greater unemployment (direct eﬀect).
Further feedback eﬀects on real prices will be caused by a change in ﬁrms’ proﬁts in the long
run rather than via wage reductions here. This does not seem a very restrictive assumption
when studying the immediate impact of ﬁnancial shocks in the present sequential model, be-
cause wage adjustments are probably lagged, so that the present direct eﬀects would probably
still outweigh the indirect eﬀects in a dynamic version of the model. Moreover, workers here
supply inelastic and country-speciﬁc labor similarly to low-wage workers whose minimum wage
is indeed exogenous.
33given by ∂ˆ θh/∂ˆ cIh and ∂ˆ θh/∂ˆ cIf (subsection 3.2), while responses to asymmet-
ric conﬁdence shocks correspond to ∂ˆ θh/∂ˆ cBh and ∂ˆ θh/∂ˆ cBf (subsection 3.3).
C.3 Calibration parameters
Table 3: Calibration parameters
matching eﬃciency µF = µC = 1;µL = 1.1,1.355,1.5
tightness elasticity ηF = ηC = 0.5;ηL = 0.66
bargaining power δF = 0.995;δF = 0.5;δL = 0.66
search costs on ﬁnancial markets cI = cB = 0.1
search costs on credit markets γC = 0.1
search costs on labor markets γL = 0.5
separation rate s = 0.1
riskfree rate r = 0.05
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